Distance vector routing protocols (e.g., RIP) 
Overview
It is well-known that today's Internet is not secure. Both Internet applications and the underlying routing infrastructures are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. Although a majority of incidents reported so far are realized by the exploitation of software vulnerabilities in client and server machines, it has been noted that abusing routing protocols may be the easiest way for launching attacks [3] , and a single misbehaving router can completely disrupt routing protocols and cause disaster [36] . This viewpoint has been more recently expressed by a group of network and security experts [8] .
There are many factors that make today's routing infrastructures insecure. Three of them are as follows. 1) There are no strong security services built into routing protocols. Many routing protocols only provide weak authentication mechanisms, e.g., plain-text password or system-wide shared keys, for authenticating peers or routing updates. As a result, it is easy for an adversary to gain access to the routing infrastructure and manipulate routing information. 2) Software vulnerabilities and misconfigurations expose routing infrastructures to severe risks. 3) Most routing protocols assume a trustworthy environment. In the case where no authentication mechanisms are implemented, routing updates are accepted only with rudimentary validation -for example, Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [26] , one of the most popular distance vector (DV) routing protocols, only checks that a routing update is from an IP address of a neighbor node and that the source UDP port number is 520. When authentication mechanisms are present, routing updates are verified for the correctness of data origin and integrity only. However, after a route update is verified to be "authentic", the routing information conveyed in the update is trusted and used to update the recipient's routing table. This is risky since data origin authentication which includes data integrity [29] , cannot guarantee the factual correctness of a message. A malicious entity or a compromised legitimate entity can send false information in a correctly signed message. A recipient can detect unauthorized alteration of the message, but cannot tell if the information conveyed in the message is factually correct unless the recipient has the perfect knowledge of what it expects to receive.
The difficulty of validating routing updates in a DV routing protocol arises due to the fact that they are the distributed computational results of other nodes [35, 43] . Smith, Murphy, and Garcia-Luna-Aceves [42] propose to include an additional field, next-to-last-hop, in routing advertisements. A loop-free path finding algorithm is used to detect routing loops, but they do not address distance fraud. Mittal and Vigna [30] propose to use intrusion detection sensors for validating routing advertisements by comparing a routing update with a master routing database that is pre-computed off-line. One disadvantage of this approach is that it cannot prevent fraudulent misinformation from poisoning others' routing tables, although it may be able to detect it. Hu, Perrig, and Johnson [19] propose to use hash chains and authentication trees to authenticate the distance of a route. However, their approach does not address longer distance fraud.
We present a secure DV routing protocol, namely S-RIP, based on RIP, which can prevent router and prefix impersonation, as well as shorter and longer distance fraud. In S-RIP, an advertised route is validated for its factual correctness before being used to update a routing table. Given the difficulty of validating the factual correctness of routing information in a DV routing protocol, we propose to use consistency as an approximation of correctness. An advertised route is treated as correct if it is consistent among those nodes that have propagated that route. Unless those nodes involved in a consistency check are in collusion, we have a high confidence that a consistent route is correct. By this approach, we hope that nodes surrounding a misbehaving node will uncover inconsistency and prevent misinformation from further spreading.
A reputation-based framework is proposed for determining how many nodes to involve in a consistency check, providing the flexibility for balancing security and efficiency. First, the notion of either trusting or distrusting a node is replaced by node reputation measured by a numeric value. Although in an intra-domain routing protocol (e.g., RIP), routers are under a single administrative domain and tend not to be mutually suspicious, they could be compromised due to software flaws. Malicious nodes can also manage to join a routing domain by exploiting routing vulnerabilities. Therefore, fully trusting any individual node even in an intra-domain routing protocol may introduce the vulnerability that a malicious node can call into question the legitimacy of other nodes. Node reputation provides the flexibility to relax this notion, and can be looked as an estimation that a node will provide correct information in the near future. Second, we propose an efficient method for computing the accumulated confidence in the correctness of a consistent routing update from the reputations of those nodes involved in the consistency check. Combined with confidence thresholds, this method effectively creates a sized window for determining how many nodes to involve in a consistency check.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces RIP and analyzes its vulnerabilities. Section 3 presents security objectives and mechanisms of S-RIP. The reputation-based framework is presented in Section 4. S-RIP is presented and analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 presents simulation results. Section 7 reviews related work for securing routing protocols, with emphasis on securing DV routing protocols. Further discussions and future work are given in the last section.
Background: RIP and its Vulnerabilities
In this section we provide an overview of RIP and review its known vulnerabilities.
Overview of RIP
RIP (we mean RIPv2) is an intra-domain DV routing protocol. Although it has certain limitations, e.g., the maximum distance between two nodes is limited to 15 hops, it is still widely used by many small and medium size organizations. For example, Our university runs RIP.
A RIP routing table consists of a number of entries, one for each destination in the network. Each route entry contains at least the following information: destination -the IP address and the subnet mask of the destination; distance -number of hops from this router to the destination; next hop -the IP address of the next router along the path to the destination; timers -a number of timers are associated with each route entry. One timer is set to 180 seconds. If no routing update about this route is received within three minutes, the distance of this route is set to 16 which designates infinity in RIP. Whenever a routing update is received about this destination, the timer is re-initialized to 180 seconds.
A router speaking RIP periodically (every 30 seconds) broadcasts routing update messages to its neighbors to advertise its routing information. A routing update message consists of up to 25 routes. Each route contains the information of destination (IP and subnet mask), distance, and the next hop. The next hop is only useful if it is directly reachable to a recipient. A routing update message may also be triggered by a route distance change.
An advertised route may lead to the update of a recipient's routing table if 1) it is a new route; 2) it is better than the existing route; or 3) it is from the originator of the existing route. In case 3), the the existing route will always be updated no matter whether the new route is shorter or longer than the existing one. If the advertised route is the same as the existing one, only the time-out timer associated with that route is reinitialized. Although it is understood that it is important to carefully validate a routing update response message before using it to update one's routing table, RIP only performs rudimentary checks (e.g., the source IP address and port number). Our proposed approach extends the validation by cross checking route consistency.
Since RIP does not keep the complete path information to a destination, it is possible that one router advertises a route to another router from which it learns that route. This will lead to the problem of counting to infinity. RIP adopts an approach, namely Split Horizon, to solve the problem. One router does not advertise a route back to the router from which it learned the route. An extension of split horizon is to advertise the route back to the router where it learned it from, but with a distance of infinity (16) . This is called Split Horizon with Poisoned Reverse. Although split horizon can break a loop between two nodes, it cannot break a loop among three or more nodes. Triggered Updates is used to speed network convergence. Whenever the metric of a route is changed, a routing update is triggered immediately without waiting for a normal periodic routing update.
RIP Vulnerabilities
RIP has several known security vulnerabilities. Five of them are discussed below.
1) An unauthorized node can easily join a routing domain and participate in routing operations (referred to as router impersonation). RIPv1 does not have any authentication mechanism. RIPv2 only uses a clear-text password for authenticating peers. Since a clear-text password can be easily captured, it provides only marginal additional security in practice. Keyed MD5 has been proposed [2] to replace the password-based authentication mechanism. However, it is still vulnerable in that one compromised router discloses keying materials of every other router in the network.
In addition, RIP does not have any mechansim for preventing a questionable node (an unauthorized node or a compromised/malicious legitimate node) from advertising fraudulent routing information about distance or next hop.
2) A questionable node can claim a zero distance to a non-directly connected network or a nonexistent network, which is often referred as prefix impersonation. The proposed MD5 authentication [2] requires a system-wide shared secret key(s). This makes it harder for router impersonation, but cannot prevent prefix impersonation. Although prefix impersonation is a bigger issue in inter-domain routing protocol (e.g., BGP), it can also cause serious problems in intradomain routing protocol (e.g., RIP). Figure 1 shows that a malicious node can easily launch service disruption (a type of Denial of Service) attacks by prefix impersonation. Similar incident (referred to as blackhole) has occurred in the ARPANET [28] . 3) A questionable node may claim a distance shorter than the actual distance to a destination (shorter distance fraud). This fraud can be used to attract traffic to launch a variety of attacks (e.g., evansdropping, session hijacking). 4) A questionable node can claim a distance longer than the actual distance for a destination. Longer distance fraud can be used to avoid traffic, which may lead to unfair utilization of network links and cause network congestion. Thus, it can be used to launch denial of service attack. This fraud is different from malicious packet dropping attacks. While they both result in packet dropping, the latter can be detected by known techniques (e.g., secure traceroute [33] ) while the former is more stealthy.
5) A questionable node may advertise arbitrary routing information or carefully crafted routes to poison others' routing tables, e.g., to cause routing loops or have invalid routes installed. In addition, a questionable node can provide false information on a next hop.
Security Objectives and Mechanisms of S-RIP
To counter security vulnerabilites of RIP, we propose a new secure DV routing protocol, namely S-RIP. The security objectives of S-RIP include: 1) preventing router impersonation; 2) preventing prefix impersonation; and 3) preventing distance fraud (both shorter and longer). Fraud can be committed by individual nodes or colluding nodes. In this paper, we only consider uncoordinated individual fraud and leave the discussion of collusion to the future work. Our proposed mechanisms for achieving the above objectives are discussed below.
Preventing Router Impersonation
To prevent router impersonation, we assume (A1) every router shares a different key with every other router in a RIP domain. With A1 and an authentication algorithm (e.g., MD5), a router can effectively detect router impersonation by validating message authentication code (MAC) of a routing update message. Pair-wise shared keys make it more difficult for an unauthorized node to impersonate a legitimate node, and ensure that the keying materials of one router will not be disclosed when another router is compromised.
One major issue with pair-wise shared keys is that they increase the complexity of key management. For example, whenever a router is added into a network, it must be pre-configured with a number of secret keys, one for each of the existing routers. In addition, a different secret key must also be distributed to each of the existing routers. This key configuration process introduces significant overhead and may result in configuration errors. However, KDC-based approach for key management is practical for intra-domain routing protocols, and automatic and secure configuration tools (e.g., for updating SNMP community strings) may also be useful for reducing the complexity of key management. Overall, we believe the assumption of pair-wise shared keys is practical for intra-domain routing protocols, and is consistent with the strong recommendation [8] by a group of security experts. Public key based methods (e.g., digital signatures) offer an attractive alternative in some regards, but also typically require a public key infrastructure which has its own setup costs and comes at some additional cost in performance (which we expect will become less important over time). Therefore, at the current time, we believe the use of pair-wise shared keys is realistic in practice, acknowledging that some additional price must be paid to make insecure routing protocol secure.
Preventing Prefix Impersonation
To prevent prefix impersonation, we assume (A2) there is a central authority (e.g., a network administrator) who has the perfect knowledge of which router is connected to which subnets in that autonomous system (AS). Such perfect knowledge, or router-prefix mapping, is realistic for an AS since network configurations are administratively controlled by a single authority. The router-prefix mapping is then securely distributed to each router. For example, it can be pre-configured on each router. Ongoing update (e.g., additions of subnets or routers) can then be done through a secure channel (e.g., SSH) between the central authority and each router. Although network topology may be dynamic (e.g., caused by link failures), we expect router-prefix mapping is relatively static. Other alternatives can also be used to prevent prefix impersonation, e.g., Address Attestation in S-BGP [24] , Authorization Certificate in soBGP [44] , etc. However, they may require a public key infrastructure which has its own drawbacks (see above).
Preventing Distance Fraud
Shorter and longer distance frauds are difficult to prevent. In a distance vector routing protocol, routing updates received by a node are computational results or aggregated routes of other nodes. Unless a node has perfect knowledge of network topology and dynamics, it appears impossible to validate the factual correctness of aggregated routing updates [35, 43] .
We propose to use consistency as an approximation of correctness. An advertised route is validated by cross checking its consistency with the routing information of those nodes from which this route is derived. If the route is consistent among those nodes, it is treated as correct. Otherwise, incorrect. For example, in Figure One property of a DV routing protocol is that a node only communicates with its direct neighbors and does not need to maintain the network topology beyond its direct neighbors. In a link state (LS) routing protocol, a node advertises its link states to every other node in the network by flooding, and each node maintains a whole view of the network topology. A3 allows a node to query non-direct neighbors, which expands node-to-node communication boundary in a DV routing protocol to a dynamic area (by our reputation-based approach 4). We note that our approach falls in between a DV and an LS. Pictorially, the communication range of an LS node covers the whole network (flooding), while the communication range of a traditional DV node only covers its direct neighbors (neighbor-to-neighbor). In S-RIP, the communication range of a node is dynamic. Although it is certainly beyond direct neighborhood and could reach the whole network, most likely, it will only cover a nearby neighborhood (e.g., within 2 or 3 hops). Therefore, additional routing overhead generated by non-neighbor querying is limited, as confirmed by our simulation results in 6. Requirement of storage space is also increased in S-RIP, but very slightly since an S-RIP node only needs to maintain the information of remote nodes when they are being or will be consulted for a consistency check.
Another question which arises is, how does a node query a remote node if it does not have a route already installed for that node? For example, in Figure 2 [23] ), this process may detect forwarding level misbehavior, (i.e., a router advertising correct routes but does not forward data packets).
To implement A3 in RIP, the next hop field in a RIP routing update message can be utilized. In RIP, the next hop field is only used for route optimization (avoiding an extra hop). For example, Thus, A3 allows a receiving node, instead of an advertising node, to decide which node should be the next hop. Despite the change of the meaning, A3 is still compatible with RIP since a receiving node will ignore the next hop field (treats it as null) if it is not directly reachable. To interoperate with an existing implementation of RIP, an S-RIP node may get next hop information from a RIP node by external mechanisms, e.g., SNMP MIB query.
Besides route optimization, A3 allows a router to construct a complete path to a destination if it chooses to do so. This is useful for diagnosis and detection of misconfiguration, e.g., routing loops or malicious packet dropping [33] .
Reputation-Based Framework
In this section we present a reputation-based framework, consisting of a repuation update function, an efficient method of computing accumulated confidence, localized rules for processing routing updates, and a sized window method for balancing security and efficiency.
Reputation Definition
We propose to use node reputation as an estimation of the confidence in that a node will provide correct routing information in the near future. Every node assigns an initial value as the reputation of every other node in a network. A node's reputation is then dynamically updated by Equation 1. The detail of how this equation is derived is given in elsewhere.
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We propose Equation 3 for computing an accumulated confidence based on node reputation in the correctness of a routing update which is consistent among a group of nodes. Definition 1 (Accumulated Confidence). Let
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Although developed independently based on our intuition, it turns out that Equation 3 is consistent with DempsterShafer theory (DST) of evidence reasoning [9, 40] if we assume that in our case, for all
¡ acquires its information from an independent source. The proof is given in elsewhere. The advantage of Equation 3 is that it is intuitive and computationally efficient. Although DST is more general, e.g., it can handle conflicting information, it is computationally less inefficient since it involves set operations.
Validation Rules
We propose a set of rules for determining how to treat routing advertisements based on node reputation. Two thresholds Rule 1 can effectively mitigate potential denial of service attacks launched by a malicious node which may try to engage another node into a long period of validation by advertising a large amount of useless routing information. We propose to timeout a node's low reputation and reassign it a medium reputation value to allow a node to raise its reputation after a specified time period Since fully trusting a node introduces the vulnerability that a compromised trusted node can spread misinformation, Rule 3 requires to validate a routing advertisement from a highly rated node with only one additional node. We propose to timeout a node's high reputation after a specified time period ¡ , and reassign it a medium reputation value to mitigate potential collusion between two nodes with high reputation.
Sized Windows
Since there may be multiple nodes having propogated an advertised route, a mechanism is required to decide how many nodes to involve in a consistency check. The more nodes consulted (which agree with the the advertised route), the higher the confidence acquired in the correctness of that route; but the network overhead will also be higher. We use a sized window as a mechanism for balancing the trade-off between security and efficiency. The size of the window is the number of the nodes consulted in a consistency check. The window size starts from 1. In other words, there is only one node in the window before the consistency check of an advertised route, which is the advertiser of that route. The window size grows by one, or an additional node is consulted, if the computed confidence using Equation 3 in the correctness of that route is less than y ¡ . The window size keeps growing for the advertised route until 1) an inconsistency occurs, i.e., a node reports conflicting information; or 2) all the nodes in the window agree upon the route, and 2.1) the computed confidence is greater than y ¡ ; or 2.2) all informed nodes have been involved. In case 1), the route fails the consistency check and is dropped. In case 2), the route succeeds the consistency check and is accepted.
Secure Routing Information Protocol (S-RIP)
We present the detail and analysis of S-RIP. For an advertised route 
S-RIP
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validates the route as required by RIP [2] . If the route passes the validation, and will be used to update 's routing table, S-RIP is triggered to perform additional validations. S-RIP will NOT be triggered if the advertised route does not indicate a route change or a topology change. Although the timer associated with this route will be re-initialized, there is no need to re-validate the route since such a validation should have been done when the route was first installed in 's routing table. Highlights of S-RIP on validating
are given immediately below. More details are presented in the remainder of this section. , performs consistency checks on
. If the consistency check succeeds, £ accepts the route. Otherwise, drops it.
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should not advertise a valid route back to from which it learns that route. Otherwise, the problem of counting to infinity occurs. Although RIP recognizes this problem and proposes split horizon (or with poisoned reverse) for solving it, a misbehaving node may not follow the rule and intentionally create the problem. is actually directly connected to that subnet. If the authentication succeeds, the router is accepted. Otherwise, dropped. Table 1 , where * denotes information fields to be provided. does not validate an infinite or unreachable route since it is trivial for ¢ £ to make a valid route unreachable if it misbehaves, e.g., by disabling a network interface or dropping packets. The consequence of such possible misbehavior is that will drop the route and will not forward packets to . It seems to be hard to force a misbehaving node forward packets for others if it is determined not to do so. Therefore, we hope a network is designed with redundancy to accommodate a single point of failure. In that case, hopefully could find an alternative route to r E , bypassing the misbehaving node £ .
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Threat Analysis
A node may misbehave in several ways: 1) advertising false routing information; 2) providing false routing information specifically during a consistency check; 3) dropping a validation request/reply message or not responding to a validation request; 4) manipulating a validation request/reply message originated from other nodes; 5) providing correct routing information but not forwarding data traffic.
1) Advertising false routing information. Given a route , e.g., longer or shorter than the actual distance. If the advertised distance,
, is 0, but £ is actually one or more hops away from r E , in our proposal, can detect this fraud by router/prefix authentication. Other shorter or longer distance fraud can be detected by cross checking consistency with those nodes which propagated the route in question. There are three scenarios in which a consistency in the corroborating group may not represent correctness: a) the nodes in the corroborating group are simultaneously misled by one or more misbehaving nodes; b) the nodes in the corroborating group are colluding; c) a subset of the corroborating group are colluding and mislead the rest of the nodes. Our idea is that by increasing the size of the corroborating group, it is increasingly unlikely that these scenarios will not be detected. ) to cover £ 's misbehavior, will be able to detect this fraud. In the case that is willing to collude with £ , we treat it as the case that £ establishes a virtual link (e.g., TCP connection) with , and those nodes forward packets over the virtual link to each other. This misbehavior is equvalent to the wormhole attack studied by Hu, Perrig, and Johnson [20] . S-RIP may detect such attack if a prior knowledge of node physical connections is assumed. Otherwise, the proposed Packet Leashes defense mechanism [20] should be used.
2) Providing false routing information in a consistency check. The fraud could be on distance or next hop. When the false information cause inconsistency, the consequences are: 2.1) correct routing advertisements may be disregarded by well-behaved nodes. We think it is not to the advantage of a misbehaving node to mislead another node by this type of misbehavior since it may be best to avoid a "valid" route through a misbehaving node in any case. By dropping a route involving a misbehaving node, the validation node may take an alternative good route, albeit possibly suboptimal. 2.2) the reputation of a well-behaved node may be decreased as a result of false information arising from a misbehaving node. In the worst case, if node 's rating of node £ 's reputation is decreased to the low range, will disregard £ 's routing advertisements for a certain period of time. Since consistency check occur only on route changes, a misbehaving node, , may only damage the reputation of £ 's reputation when there is a route change which involves both and £ in a consistency check. 's own reputation may also be decreased if it provides false information. Therefore, is unable to damage another node's reputation at its will. On the other hand, £ has other chances to increase its reputation when it advertises good routes (without going through ) to
. So the effect of the type of misbehavior depends on the network topology and the location of the misbehaving nodes. If one or more misbehaving nodes are located on the links which can form a network-cut, they may be able to completely separate the network through collusion. It would appear no approach is resilient to such misbehavior.
3) Dropping a validation request/reply message or not responding to a validation request. This misbehavior can disrupt a validation process. As a result, the route being validated will be dropped. We do not consider this as a major drawback since dropping a route with misbehaving nodes en route allows an alternative route to be discovered. An adversary may launch this type of attack when it is not willing to forward packets for other nodes. As discussed before, a misbehaving node can avoid traffic by many other ways, e.g., dropping packets based on source or destination addresses, or simply disabling a network interface. We rely upon network redundancy and other mechanisms [33] to counter this type of misbehavior.
4)
Manipulating a validation request/response message originated from other nodes. If all routers are deployed with SRIP and use MD5 for message authentication, validation request/response messages cannot be manipulated en route. However, communication between a secured router and a remote insecure router is not authenticated. The consequences are: 4.1) A routing response sent back by a remote non-secured router can be modified by an adversary en route. The adversary may modify the routing response in such a way that it would confirm the consistency of a false advertised route; 4.2) An adversary may intercept routing requests sent to a non-secured router, and produce false responses on behave of that router. This vulnerability can be addressed by IP layer security. For example, if IPSec is available, an adversary would not be able to manipulate or intercept routing requests or responses between two remote nodes. It can also be mitigated if we assume that an adversary does not have the capability to launch attacks in packet level. It is easy for an adversary to manipulate a routing table to make a router to broadcast fraudulent routing information. It may not be that easy to manipulate packets transmitted through a router if the adversary does not have sufficient control over that router, e.g., modify and compile source codes, install malicious software, etc.
5) Providing correct routing information but not forwarding data traffic.
We can make routing request and response messages indistinguishable from normal data traffic to validate forwarding level behavior of intermediate routers. Other detection techniques (e.g., probing) for identifying such misbehaving routers can also be integrated into S-RIP, we do not address the issue in this paper.
One characteristic of S-RIP is that it does not guarantee that a validated route is optimal. In fact, S-RIP proposed in this paper only validates route consistency, without considering the cost. S-RIP always accepts a consistent route and disregards an inconsistent one regardless of its cost. Therefore, optimal route involving a misbehaving node may not be used. We consider this as a good tradeoff between routing security and efficiency.
Efficiency Analysis
We consider the worst case here. The efficiency of average cases is analyzed by simulation ( 6). Suppose we use RIP message for route request and response. Each route request would need two route entries, one for the routing information from the recipient to the ultimate destination, and one for the routing information from the recipient to its predecessor node on that route. The RIP message header is (24 bytes including authentication data), and each route entry is 20 bytes. Thus, one route request or response is 64 bytes. Plus the UDP header (8 bytes) and IP header (20 bytes), a packet carrying a route request or response is 92 bytes. The total overhead of routing validation, in addition to the overhead of regular routing updates, in the most secure case is 
Incremental Deployment
A practical challenge of securing routing protocols is how to make the secured version interoperative with the existing infrastructure. Despite their technical merits, many proposed mechanisms for securing routing protocols are not widely deployed due to the fact that they require significant modifications to existing implementations and/or do not provide backward interoperability. Since it is unrealistic to expect that an existing routing infrastructure can be replaced by a secured version in a very short period of time, ideally a secured version should be compatible with the insecure protocols. It is also desirable that security can be increased progressively as more routers are deployed with the secured protocol.
To this end, S-RIP supports incremental deployment. We propose that messages exchanged in S-RIP conform to the message format defined in RIP. S-RIP can be implemented as a compatible upgrade to the existing RIP, and a S-RIP router performs routing functions the same way as a RIP router. Therefore, deploying S-RIP on a router only requires a down time for the period of installation and rebooting of RIP processes. Since RIP router responds to a routing request from a non direct neighbor (remote node), a S-RIP router can successfully get information (albeit not authenticated) from a non-secured router for a consistency check. In other words, a RIP router can participate in a consistency check, but not initiate a consistency check. Thus, even before S-RIP is deployed on all routers, the routing table of a S-RIP router is partially protected as it is built from validated routing updates. The more routers deployed with S-RIP, the more reliable the routing tables in the network become. Therefore, we can say that security can be increased incrementally.
Simulation
We implemented S-RIP in the network simulator NS2 [12] as an extension to the distance vector routing protocol provided by NS2. The entry point of S-RIP is in the procedure compute-routes£ ¥ ¤ in the Tcl DV class. S-RIP is triggered if an advertised route is used to update a recipient's routing table. We are in the progress of studying how S-RIP performs in different networks, in terms of number of nodes, node degrees, and the network diameter, and how network performance is affected by different settings of the two thresholds ( 4.2). In this section, we present our preliminary simulation results on how routing overhead is affected by different threshold settings and number of misbehaving nodes in S-RIP.
Simulation Environment
Network Topology: we simulated S-RIP with a number of different network topologies. In this paper, we only present the simulation results for one topology which has 50 routers and 82 network links. This topology is based on a real network with 5 geographic locations, each location has two core routers. Each core router in one location is connected to one of the core routers in every other location. Fraud: we simulated misbehaving nodes which commit either or both shorter and longer distance fraud ( 3.3). We randomly selected 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 nodes to commit fraud in each run of the simulation. Note that 25 misbehaving nodes represent 50% of the total nodes. Each misbehaving node periodically (every 2.5 seconds) randomly selects a route from its routing table and makes its distance shorter or longer. Simulation Scenarios: we simulated 5 scenarios (Table 2) 
Routing Overhead
To determine how much network overhead is generated by S-RIP, we compared the S-RIP overhead to the total routing overhead, which is calculated as the sum of S-RIP overhead and regular routing update overhead in RIP. Since the distance vector routing protocol provided by NS2 is not a strict implementation of RIP RFCs, we could not obtain network overhead directly from the NS2 trace file. We use
to calculate the ratio of S-RIP overhead and the total routing overhead, where G is the total number of S-RIP message transmissions, § is the total number of rounds of regular routing updates, 92 bytes is the size of the packet carrying a S-RIP message (see 3.4) , and 632 bytes is the overhead generated by one router in one round of regular routing updates. By looking at the output data from the simulation, we observed that an advertised malicious route can be successfully detected by a consistency check. This is precisely what we expected. Figure 3 compares the S-RIP overhead in different scenarios. 1) In a maximally secured network, S-RIP overhead is very high (about 40% of the total routing overhead). The S-RIP overhead stays relatively flat when the number of misbehaving nodes increases. This is because every node needs to validate every route with every other node on that route. In our implementation, a new route is not considered if the current route is being checked for consistency. Since it takes long time for a consistency check to complete, most new route changes (malicious or non-malicious) are not checked for their consistency. Therefore, overhead increased by new malicious updates is insignificant. This indicates that the speed of network convergence is significantly slowed down. We expect that it would make no difference in terms of overhead if we allow a new route to interrupt an ongoing consistency check as several uncompleted consistency checks would generate similar amount of S-RIP overhead as a completed one does. 2) In the three partially secured scenarios, S-RIP overhead is relatively low (less than 8.6%) when there are only 10% of misbehaving nodes. S-RIP overhead increases significantly when the number of misbehaving nodes increases. Since the number of nodes involved in a consistency check is relatively low in these scenarios, it takes less time to complete. Thus more malicious updates will trigger more consistency checks and result in more S-RIP overhead. S-RIPoverhead decreases when y £ and y ¡ are moved toward each other because: a) the number of nodes involved in a consistency check decreases; b) the number of routes dropped without being checked for consistency increases when more than 20% of the nodes misbehave. 3) There is no S-RIP overhead in a non-secured network since S-RIP is never triggered.
Simulation Results

Maximally Secured
Related Work
Significant work has been done in securing routing protocols. Perlman [35] is the first to recognize and to study the problem of securing routing infrastructures. Perlman classified router failures into two categories: simple failures and byzantine failures. A router with simple failure stops functioning completely. A router with byzantine failure may be functioning, but not properly. Perlman proposed to use public key signatures, resource reservation, hop by hop acknowledgments, and source routing, among other mechanisms, to achieve robust flooding and robust routing. The proposed solution is based on link state approach and can guarantee to find a non-faulty path from a non-faulty source to a non-faulty destination provided there is a such a path in the network.
Kumar [25] proposed to use digital signatures and sequence numbers to protect subverted network links. By gaining the control of a network link, an intruder can modify or replay routing updates. Digital signatures can prevent unauthorized alternation of routing updates. Sequentially numbering routing updates can prevent replay attacks. Kumar also proposed to use retransmission and acknowledgments for improving reliability and security. Smith et al. [42] proposed to use digital signatures, sequence numbers, and a loop-free path finding algorithm for securing DV routing protocols. By including an additional field, next-to-last-hop, in an advertised route, a recipient node can validate based on its local routing information if a routing loop can be formed. One disadvantage is that it cannot prevent longer or shorter distance fraud.
Goodrich [14] proposed a method, called leapfrog, for securing DV routing protocols. The proposed method can ensure that a node always chooses the minimum value as the cost for a destination among all the values received from its neighbors. This approach inexplicitly assume that one node will receive an advertised route for a destination from every of its neighbors, which may not be true. Another disadvantage is that it is vulnerable to replay attacks.
Mittal and Vigna [30] proposed to use sensorbased intrusion detection for securing DV routing protocols. One notable advantage of their approach is that it does not require modifications to the routing protocol being secured. Thus, it allows incremental deployment. One disadvantage is that it cannot prevent fraudulent routing advertisements from poisoning others' routing tables, although it may be able to detect them.
Hu, Perrig and Johnson [18, 19, 21] proposed several efficient mechanisms using one-way hash chains and authentication trees as construction primitives for securing DV routing protocols. Their approach is one of the first attempts to authenticate the factual correctness of DV routing updates, and can prevent shorter and same distance fraud. It can also prevent newer sequence number fraud if a sequence number is used to indicate the freshness of a routing update. However, it does not address longer distance fraud.
Pei et al. [34] proposed a triangle theorem for detecting potentially or probably invalid RIP advertisements. Probing messages based on UDP and ICMP are used to further determine the validity of a questionable route. One disadvantage is that probing messages may be manipulated. A node advertising an invalid route can convince a receiver that route is valid by: 1) manipulating the TTL value in a probing message; or 2) sending back an ICMP message (port unreachable) on behalf of the destination.
Many researchers have explored securing link state routing protocols (e.g., OSPF) [35, 36, 32, 6, 7, 4, 43] and BGP [41, 24, 15, 1] . Securing wireless ad hoc networks has also attracted extensive interest [48, 27, 48, 5, 17, 18, 46, 20] . Reputation-based systems have been used to facilitate trust in electronic commerce [38, 45] .
